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n his famous dictum, Lord Russell remarked: “The law of 
causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among 
philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the 
monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no 
harm.”1 Russell took the principle of causality to be entirely inco-
herent, and it‟s no wonder: since Hume, philosophers have 
thought of „causality‟ as a metaphysically dubious concept, one 
which purports a mysterious necessary connection between an 
event A and its respective effect B. Hume‟s momentous critique 
of the rationalist principle spawned a contemporary debate, one 
which undoubtedly motivated the entire Kantian enterprise, but 
one to which Kant also directly contributed in the Second Anal-
ogy of the Transcendental Analytic. 
 In the introduction to the Prolegomena, Kant summarized 
Hume‟s accomplishment: “he proved incontrovertibly that it is 
entirely impossible for reason to think such a combination a priori 
and from concepts, for such a combination contains necessity; 
but it absolutely cannot be conceived why, because something is, 
some else must also necessarily be, and thus how the concept of 
such a connection can be introduced a priori” (4:257). Hume 
demonstrated that the rationalist a priori principle of causality is 
groundless, for “when we look about us towards external objects, 
and consider the operation of causes, we are never able, in a sin-
gle instance, to discover any power or necessary connexion; any 
quality, which binds the effect to the cause.”2 Causation, for 
Hume, has mere inductive status; as such, it is not determinate 
and only succeeds in establishing a contingent connection be-
tween two events. The occurrence of an event A immediately 
and regularly followed by an event B is not an instantiation of 
the rationalist notion of necessary connection; rather, the mis-
taken construal of A and B‟s close arrangement as a necessary 
one is a consequence of mere habit of mind brought about by the 
constant „conjunction‟ of the two events in experience.3 In short, 
event A does not cause B, but merely precedes it in occasion.  
 Kant thought that the only way to vindicate any principle 
of causality was to abandon attempts to derive its necessity 
through experiential grounds; “it must either be grounded com-
pletely a priori in the understanding or be entirely abandoned as 
a mere chimera” (B123). As Hume demonstrated, the explanatory 
efficacy of experience is necessarily limited to the observation of 
customary occurrences through which at best I might be able to 
affirm that in all formerly observed instances of A, B subse-
quently follows. Such grounds fall short of what‟s needed, that 
is, some grounds through which to derive a necessary law to 
which all-future, hitherto unknown, experience must conform. In 
recognizing that the objective reality of an a priori principle of 
causality can only be established through a priori means, Kant‟s 
reply to Hume must therefore be understood as an attempt to 
positively establish the concept through an appeal to the under-
standing, where “the effect is not merely joined to the cause, but 
rather is posited through it and results from it” in accordance with 
a universal rule (B124).  
 In the Transcendental Analytic, Kant treats the under-
standing as the source of a priori concepts, which along with the 
forms of intuition, give rise to a priori cognition. Kant derives the 
pure concepts of the understanding, or the categories, from twelve 
logical functions or forms of judgment. These twelve logical 
functions are supposed to serve as „clues‟ to the corresponding 
ways in which we form concepts of objects. On the supposition 
that the “understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity 
entirely measured by these [logical] functions” (B107), Kant de-
rives his Table of Categories: twelve categories for conceiving of 
the quantity, quality, relation, and modality of objects (B106). 
Kant goes on to argue in the transcendental deduction that all 
twelve pure concepts of the understanding apply universally and 
necessarily to the objects of experience. His argument here relies 
on the “transcendental unity of apperception”: a single unitary 
consciousness or continuous string of experiences is possible if 
and only if our intuitions, procured through the sensibility, are 
synthesized via thought through the categories so as to present us 
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with the objects of experience. The application of the categories 
to what we might call our „sense-data‟ is a necessary condition 
for the representation of the objects of experience. In the second 
analogy, the category of interest—derived from the hypothetical 
form of judgment—purports to explain causal relations and de-
pendencies (B106) amongst the objects of experience for “only 
thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and 
not merely of my [own subjective] apprehension, that an 




 The “Analogies of Experience”, of which the Second 
Analogy is a part, concerns the class of categories Kant calls rela-
tions. The relational category of causality, once applied to what‟s 
given to us in space and time, necessarily grounds “the real upon 
which, whenever it is posited, something else always fol-
lows” (B183). The argument for causality relies on a distinction 
between an objective and a subjective succession of representa-
tions, since Kant takes judgments concerning the objective altera-
tions of the states of a substance to be justified if and only if 
every objective alteration behaves according to a necessary rule 
of succession, viz. causality. 
 The analogies of experience, broadly speaking, rely on 
two assumptions: (i) the unity of apperception and (ii) the appli-
cation of schematized categories.  Again, “the unity of appercep-
tion” requires the necessary connection of perceptions and the 
synthetic unity of appearances in a single time. This ensures one, 
and not many, temporal intervals. The second assumption arises 
out of the need to place events along a temporal interval despite 
an inability to perceive time in itself. Time understood in abstrac-
tion from its phenomenal content tells us that we must pass 
through T1 before we reach T2. We cannot experience T1 after or 
at the same time as T2. It is through this trivial precept of time-
relations that we avoid the contradictory notion of T1 as both pre-
sent and future. That is, T1 which is prior to T2, cannot be both 
simultaneous and subsequent to T2, for “successive periods of 
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time constitute a series in which no one period can bear the same 
relation to that which precedes and that which follows.”4 Ac-
cordingly, objective time-relations are of two sorts: successive and 
simultaneous (co-existent). The Second Analogy turns to the suc-
cessive order of our subjective perceptions and asks whether these 
successive perceptions of the states of a substance could have 
been ordered differently. To put it more precisely, given that pri-
vate perceptions of the objects of experience constitute a succes-
sive sequence, are there sequences of perceptions such that the 
temporal-order is irreversible?  
 Kant‟s thought is that if the temporal-order of a sequence 
of perceptions is irreversible (and certain other conditions hold), 
then our objective experience is possible only through the appli-
cation of an a priori concept of the understanding. In other words, 
our experience of objective events presupposes the application of 
the causal category. Alternatively, if our apprehension of the 
manifold yields a sequence of perceptions such that the temporal
-order is reversible, then in virtue of the reversibility of the sub-
jective succession of representations, we know that no objective 
event has occurred. The absence of an objective event implies an 
indeterminate, wholly subjective temporal-order. An object that 
is not successive in itself is apprehended in some unique tempo-
ral order merely because our apprehension of the manifold of 
appearances is always successive (B234). In the absence of an ob-
jective event, we know that the states of the substance itself are co
-existent; though our perceptions of it might occur in some other 
temporal order, such an order is contingent upon our assorted 
perceptual freedoms, e.g. scanning left-to-right, right-to-left, top-
to-bottom, and not determined by succession in the object itself. 
 “Thus, e.g., the apprehension of the manifold in the ap-
pearance of a house that stands before me is successive. Now the 
question is whether the manifold of this house itself is also suc-
cessive, which certainly no one will concede” (B235). Let‟s call 
our perception of the roof of a house AR and our perception of 
the doorway BR, and let‟s assume that AR and BR are independ-
ently perceptible. The house is meant to exemplify an object in 
which A and B do not succeed one another. Rather, they are co-
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existent since it is possible to experience either AR or BR prior to 
the other. AR and BR possess what Strawson calls “order-
indifference”5, in view of the fact that [ARBR]-irreversibility does 
not hold. To use Beck‟s terminology6, [ARBR] does not imply the 
objective event [AB], which symbolizes a state A in an object 
which precedes a state B in an object. Nothing has happened; no 
objective event has occurred; no state has come to be in a sub-
stance that formerly was not (B237). 
 Kant contrasts this sequence of successive perceptions of 
a house, which does not constitute an objective event (given that 
the manifold is not apprehended in a necessary order), with suc-
cessive perceptions of a ship driven downstream. A moving ship 
is meant to serve as an obvious example of a sequence of succes-
sive perceptions that lacks “order-indifference”, and hence con-
stitutes an objective event. “My perception of its position down-
stream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is 
impossible that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship 
should first be perceived downstream and afterwards up-
stream” (B237).  The subject‟s various perceptual freedoms, e.g. 
scanning left-to-right, right-to-left, top-to-bottom, etc., have no 
bearing on the temporal-order of the successive perceptions—the 
order is objectively determined. Let‟s call our perception of the 
ship upstream AR and our perception of the ship downstream BR. 
As a result of the successiveness of the object itself, it is not possi-
ble to view BR prior to AR, all subjects necessarily apprehend AR 
prior to BR, i.e. [ARBR]-irreversibility holds.  Apprehension is 
“bound to” the order of the sequence of perceptions. 
 Causality figures into Kant‟s objective-subjective distinc-
tion through the claim that a subject‟s conception of an objective 
event, i.e. [AB], necessitates or presupposes the application of a 
causal principle to the relevant objects of perception. In the ab-
sence of such a principle, we‟d lack the ability to Comprehend a 
determinate, necessary temporal-ordering. The successive per-
ceptions of an objective event are necessarily connected according 
to a rule (B238). For otherwise, “if one were to suppose that noth-
ing preceded an occurrence that it must follow in accordance 
with a rule, then all sequence of perception would be determined 
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solely in apprehension, i.e., merely subjectively, but it would not 
thereby be objectively determined which of the perceptions must 
be the preceding one and which the succeeding one” (B239). 
 Again, Kant‟s argument relies on a crucial objective-
subjective distinction, since an irreversible sequence of percep-
tions would require that one perception succeed another in the 
object of experience and not merely in the subject‟s apprehension 
of the manifold of appearances. Conceived in this manner, objec-
tivity is effectively a form of inter-subjectivity: any subject must 
apprehend such an irreversible sequence of perceptions in a de-
terminate order. The understanding, according to the universal 
law of cause and effect, imputes a temporal order to phenomena 
by attributing to each phenomenon a place in a temporal interval 
in relation to antecedent and subsequent phenomenon. In the 
Transcendental Deduction Kant established that we must em-
ploy concepts of objects in order to have objective experience. 
Here, in the Second Analogy, Kant affirms that “[we] render 
[our] subjective synthesis of apprehension objective only by ref-
erence to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in 
their succession, that is, as they happen, are determined by the 
preceding state” (B240). 
 
A NON SEQUITUR OF NUMBING GROSSNESS 
 
 In the classic, The Bounds of Sense, P.F. Strawson famously 
assessed the merits of Kant‟s argument: “the order of perceptions 
is characterized not only as necessary, but as a determined order, 
an order in which our apprehension is bound down, or which we 
are compelled to observe. These may all perhaps be admitted as 
legitimate ways of expressing the denial of order-indifference. 
But from this point the argument proceeds by a non sequitur of 
numbing grossness.”7  As Strawson recognized, [ARBR]-
irreversibility does not imply [AB]-irreversibility, since this 
would require an A-type state of substance to necessarily give 
way to a B-type state of substance. No such necessity has been 
established. We cannot infer from the irreversibility of percep-
tions of the states of a substance, the irreversibility of the objects 
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themselves. Thus, what Lovejoy similarly deemed to be “one of 
the most spectacular examples of the non sequitur…to be found in 
the history of philosophy”8 is as follows: 
1. [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB] 
2. [AB] → [AB]-irreversibility 
3. Therefore, [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]-irreversibility 
 Strawson‟s charge denies the validity of (1) and a fortiori 
the validity of (2), which together amount to the implausible 
claim that [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]-irreversibility. The non 
sequitur is rooted in Kant‟s failure account for two conditions that 
must be satisfied if [ARBR]-irreversibility is to imply [AB]-
irreversibility. The first of these must be satisfied in order to 
know simply whether an objective event has occurred. Recall 
Kant‟s example of the house, where AR (the roof) co-exists with 
BR (the doorway). The principle of opposites or contraries, a 
metaphysical offshoot of the principle of non-contradiction, im-
plies that incompatible conditions cannot co-exist. A static state 
of substance cannot logically suffer contrary things at the same 
time in the same part of itself.9  A house‟s roof and doorway cer-
tainly are not incompatible states of a substance, and as such, 
they are co-existent. Alternatively, Kant‟s example of a boat be-
ing driven downstream satisfies the non-coexistence condition as 
it cannot be both upstream and downstream (at the same time) in 
relation to some point along the river.  Hereinafter, [AB] symbol-
izes an objective event, i.e. an objective succession in the sub-
stance itself; [ARBR] symbolizes our subjective representations of 
the states of substance. This notation is borrowed from Lewis 
White Beck (see references).  Therefore, at the very least, we 
know that the movement of the boat constitutes an objective 
event, but this does not tell us whether [AB] or [BA] occurs. If we 
suppose non-coexistence, premise (1) should be reformulated as:  
i. [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB] or [BA] (given non-
coexistence) 
 To know that [AB] and not-[BA] has occurred, we must 
know that perceptual isomorphism, i.e. “the condition that there 
be no relevant difference in the modes of causal dependence of 
AR on A and BR on B” holds. Perceptual isomorphism requires 
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that the causal process that connects A with its perceptual effect 
AR occur prior to the causal process that connects B with its per-
ceptual effect BR. There are a number of ways perceptual isomor-
phism can fail to hold. “A cunning arrangement of mirrors, de-
signed to reflect some of the light over large distances before it 
reached my eyes might ensure that I saw later events before the 
earlier.”10 Or, to give a more concrete example, given that light 
travels faster than sound, we might see Cornell University‟s 
McGraw clock tower strike midnight before we hear its bells 
chime despite the fact that McGraw strikes one and its bells be-
gin to ring at exactly the same time, i.e. midnight. Nonetheless, if 
this condition holds, AR will necessarily precede BR, that is, the 
objective event [AB] will compel us to observe AR & BR in one 
and only one order, viz., [ARBR]. Therefore:  
ii. [AB]→[ARBR]-irreversibility (given perceptual iso-
morphism) 
 In light of (i) and (ii), Kant‟s causal schema, i.e. [AB]-
irreversibility, derived in premise (3) is valid if and only if we 
know that A and B are not co-existent and perceptual isomor-
phism holds. If we know non-coexistence, as we do in Kant‟s 
own boat example, the crux of Strawson objection has to do with 
the invalid move from the plausible objective temporal claim that 
B succeeds A in the object, i.e. [AB], to the objective casual 
schema, i.e. [AB]-irreversibility, which makes the stronger claim 
that A never succeeds B in the object, i.e. never-[BA]. To make the 
move from (1) to (2), we must know or have sufficient reason to 
believe that perceptual isomorphism holds, but to know this, we 
must know or have sufficient reason to believe [AB]-
irreversibility. Alas, this is the very causal schema Kant is seek-
ing! 
 
LEWIS WHITE BECK:  
SAVIOR OF THE SECOND ANALOGY? 
 
Now, there are some who would like to save Kant from Strawson 
by claiming that a general causal law is the only thing that could 
ground objective succession—they try to avoid the non sequitur 
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by avoiding appeals to particular causal laws. They argue that 
Kant is setting out to establish a universal principle of causality, 
a principle he treats as distinct from any empirical instantiations 
that might ground a causal connection between a particular A 
and a particular B.  Although Kant‟s proof aims to provide the a 
priori basis for the relationship between successive objective 
states of substance, he says nothing about any particular causal 
law or what might constitute a proper antecedent condition. As 
he puts it himself, “there are thus certain laws, in fact a priori 
laws, that first make a nature possible. Empirical laws can obtain, 
and be discovered, only by means of experience, and indeed in 
virtue of these original laws through which experience itself first 
becomes possible” (B263). 
 Though while a transcendental principle of the under-
standing is established entirely independent of all experience, 
particular casual laws are not solely derived through empirical 
means, since they are “grounded in or made possible by [a] tran-
scendental principle of the understanding.”11 Hence, a defense 
against the classical charge of non sequitur that relies on a strong 
distinction between the transcendental principle and its empiri-
cal instantiations is unavailable. A particular causal law is neces-
sarily subsumed under the transcendental principal, conse-
quently, the separation is not sufficiently strong; the two are not 
logically exclusive, as they must be, if the proof is to survive 
Strawson‟s charge. It therefore seems that we must look else-
where for an adequate defense of Kant.  
 If Strawson is correct to interpret Kant to infer as he takes 
him to infer, then the charge of non sequitur is fitting. There‟s no 
doubt that simply inferring [AB]-irreversibility from [ARBR]-
irreversibility would qualify as a non sequitur, but as Lewis White 
Beck argues in his defense of Kant‟s proof, this is not Kant‟s in-
ference. In a short essay, entitled A Non Sequitur of Numbing 
Grossness?, Beck interprets Kant as follows12:  
 
1. [ARBR]-irreversibility → [AB]-irreversibility if and 
only if (i) A and B are not coexistent and (ii) perceptual 
isomorphism does not fail. 
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2. To know [AB], given [ARBR]-irreversibility, requires: 
(i) knowledge that A & B are opposite states of a sub-
stance; and (ii) knowledge of [AB]- irreversibility to 
ensure that perceptual isomorphism does not fail. 
3. Knowledge of 3(i) is sufficient to know that A & B 
are not coexistent, i.e. there is an objective event, but 
knowledge of 3(i) is not sufficient to know whether 
[AB] or [BA] has occurred. 
4. In virtue of Hume‟s conception of causality, I can 
know that [AB] occurs. 
5. If I know [AB], then I know not-[BA], which implies 
knowledge of [AB]-irreversibility. 
6. Given knowledge of [AB]-irreversibility, I know per-
ceptual isomorphism does not fail in virtue of 3(ii). 
7. [AB]-irreversibility is the schema of causation 
8. Therefore, to know that [AB] occurs, I must know 
that A contains the casual condition of B. 
 
Beck‟s interpretation, in contrast to Strawson‟s, differs in that 
premise (2) attributes to Kant‟s proof recognition of the two con-
ditions outlined above. Beck takes Kant to acknowledge these 
conditions at B234: “The objective relation of appearances [that 
is, of A and B] that follow upon one another is not to be deter-
mined through mere perception [that is, from the sequential rela-
tion of AR & BR].”13 
 However, one might be skeptical of Beck‟s defense. Prem-
ise (4), in particular, seems problematic, since to know perceptual 
isomorphism holds, I must know [AB] irreversibility, but to 
know this, I must know that [AB] and not-[BA] has occurred. 
But, can I know [AB] has occurred from mere experience? It ap-
pears, at first glance, that Beck is begging the question, since all 
that experience can offer is knowledge of [ARBR]. And this would 
be a valid objection to Beck as Kant is not entitled to (4) insofar as 
his argument is a general proof of the universal principle of cau-
sality. But as Beck points out, insofar as the Second Analogy is 
meant to serve as a reply to Hume, Kant is entitled to claim he 
knows [AB] occurred, “for Hume knows [AB] but has skeptical 
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doubts about [AB]-necessarily.”14 Meaning, if we‟re to grant Kant 
knowledge of [AB], then perceptual isomorphism holds, thereby 
yielding sufficient grounds for inferring from [ARBR]-
irreversibility that [AB]-irreversibly occurs. If we treat the Sec-
ond Analogy as a direct reply to Hume, in which case Kant can 
make use of Hume‟s own assumptions, Beck would have us be-
lieve that Strawson‟s charge is misplaced. 
 But what did Hume mean when he said that we can know 
[AB]? In anticipation of Kant‟s later analytic/synthetic distinc-
tion, Hume maintained a two-pronged conception of reason, 
where on the one hand, it served to discover the pure relations 
between ideas, while on the other, it served to discover matters 
of fact in sensory experience.15 Hume‟s epistemic criteria there-
fore says that statements of relations of ideas are „either intui-
tively or demonstratively certain‟, where by „certain‟ Hume 
means that we are justified „by the mere operation of thought‟ in 
not questioning a statement‟s truth.16 Statement‟s about matters 
of fact, on the other hand, depend on evidence gained through 
experience. Accordingly, Hume rejects „obscure and uncertain‟17 
metaphysical concepts such as power, force, or necessary connec-
tion, since they don‟t fall under either function of reason: 
 
Let an object be presented to a man of ever so 
strong natural reason and abilities; if that object be 
entirely new to him, he will not be able, by the most 
accurate examination of its sensible qualities, to dis-
cover any of its causes or effects.18 
 
So, then, how can we know or have sufficient reason to believe 
that [AB] occurs within the Humean architectonic? To believe, 
says Hume, is simply to judge a proposition to be true. Causal 
inference is simply the product of belief in cause-effect relations: 
 
Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, 
firm, steady conception of an object, than what the 
imagination is ever able to attain. This variety of 
terms, which may seems so unphilosophical, is in-
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tended only to express that act of mind, which ren-
ders realities, or what is taken for such, more pre-
sent to us than fictions.19 
 
And so, while our causal inferences are not justified, we nonethe-
less come to believe them, and some cases, even come to know 
them. Once Kant knows [AB] has occurred and not [BA], he can 
then justifiably know [AB]-irreversibility occurs.  By falling back 
on his grand doctrine of transcendental idealism, it then follows 
that A must contain the causal conditions of B, for otherwise 
Kant would argue, there‟d be no grounds in the understanding 
for experiencing the objective event [AB]-irreversibly. To know 
any such objective event necessitates the application of causal 
category, since the effect, i.e. B, is joined to the cause, i.e. A, in 
our understanding by thinking through the causal category. 
 But, one is now stricken by the utter dependence of the 
second analogy on Kant‟s underlying doctrine of transcendental 
idealism. If Kant intends for [AB]-irreversibility to serve as the 
causal schema, then it can only do so if we presuppose Kant‟s 
conception of the world of appearances as given to us in the sen-
sibility and brought under the categories. For otherwise, we‟d 
have yet another whopping non sequitur: it doesn‟t follow from 
Kant‟s premises in the second analogy that we must apply the 
pure concepts of the understanding to the manifold of appear-
ances. We needn‟t, at least not in virtue of Kant‟s objective/
subjective distinction, posit a causal law. We might very well 
posit some other doctrine to account for irreversible objective 
succession in objects. We might be sympathizers of the early Car-
tesian, Nicholas Malebranche, whereby we account for irreversi-
ble objective succession by attributing it to God‟s will. If we ob-
tain ideas of external things by viewing them within God him-
self, then there‟s no need (nor are we justified) to treat [AB]-
irreversibility as the causal schema. Again, if we abandon the 
force of transcendental idealism, Kant‟s reply to Hume fails. To 
establish the principle of causality, we must read the second 
analogy through a transcendental idealist‟s spectacles, since once 
removed a Malebranchian theory will do just as well. Kant, of 
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